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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

European Communities*
I. Constitutional and Institutional Matters
A.

PROPOSED COMMUNITY COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE

If Community law can be analogized to U.S. federal law as having, to
some extent, the relationship to the national laws of Community Member
States that U.S. federal law has to U.S. state laws (more accurately,
perhaps, the relationship that federal law would have to state laws if the
United States Constitution consisted only of the Commerce Clause), then
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) corresponds to
the United States Supreme Court, as the Supreme "Federal" Court of
the Communities. But the analogy rapidly breaks down, not least because
the ECJ has first instance jurisdictions, I and until now has had no equivalents of United States Federal District Courts or Courts of Appeal beneath it in a "Community" judicial hierarchy. It is the sole Community
court, and beneath it are the national courts of the Member States, which
correspond more precisely to U.S. state courts. However, as mentioned
in a previous issue, 2 the Single European Act (SEA) 3 permits the creation
of a Community Court of First Instance, 4 which would perform something
of the role of a Federal District Court, in Community law. The ECJ's own
proposals for the setting up of such a court, in the form of a draft Council
5
Decision, have now been published in Common Market Law Reports.

*Prepared by David L. Perrott, Dean of the Faculty of Law, and Reader in Business Law
in the Centre for European Legal Studies, University of Exeter, U.K.
I. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 169,
170, 171, 173, 175 & 178, 298 U.N.T.S. I I [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Regional Developments: European Communities, 21 INT'L LAW. 571, 572-73 (1987).
3. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES Supp. 2/86, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986) (hereinafter
SEA].
4. Id. arts. 4, It & 26; EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 168A; Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art. 32d, 260 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter
ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 140A, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty].
5. 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 185 (1988) [hereinafter Draft Decision].

1228

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Under these proposals the new court would sit, like the ECJ, in Luxembourg, 6 in a number of separate chambers, 7 and would have jurisdiction
to hear: 1. labor disputes between the Communities and their employees;
2. actions by natural or legal persons (but not by Member States) against
Community institutions alleging excess of powers (under Article 173,
EEC) or failure to act (under Article 175, EEC) 8 in matters of competition
law and trade protection against dumping or illicit subsidies; 9 together
with any associated actions for damages. 10 The ECJ would exclusively
retain its existing first instance jurisdiction in all other matters.
B.

LEGAL BASIS OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION

In E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, Re Generalized Tariff Preferences"
the Commission and the Council had disagreed as to the appropriate legal
basis for Council legislation giving effect to the GTP system. The Commission had argued for article 113, EEC, which empowers legislation in
the field of Community commercial policy by a qualified majority vote in
Council. The Council had argued for article 235, EEC, which confers
residual and general legislative powers, but requires unanimity in Council.
Finding that unanimity could not be achieved anyway, however, the Council purported to legislate on a qualified majority basis, but without specifying in the preamble to the Regulation precisely which Treaty article
was the empowering source. The Commission challenged the validity of
the Regulation before the ECJ, and won on both points. The Court held
that: 1. the proper basis for this Regulation was article 113, not article
235, on the principle that where a more specific empowering source was
available, it should be used, notwithstanding that it imposed different legal
or political constraints from those of a more general source; 2. the Preamble to Community legislation is an important part of the text of the legislation, and in particular must specify as exactly as possible the
empowering source, or other legal basis, under which the legislation purports to be made. Failure to comply renders the legislation invalid. This
judgment would seem to create a new ground for challenging the constitutionality of Community legislation.

6. id. art. 2(l).
7. Id. art. 2(2).

8. Same results under the equivalent articles of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 4.
9. Draft Decision, supra note 5, art. 3().
10. Id., art. 3(2).
II. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 121) 8 (1986); 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 131 (1988).
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II. Competition (Antitrust) Law
A.

AIR TRANSPORT AND COMPETITION

12

The gap left in the implementation of the basic competition provisions
of the EEC Treaty (articles 85 and 86) in the field of air transport by the
adoption of implementing regulations in all other fields has been finally
closed by the enactment by the Council, on December 14, 1987, of a
legislative package designed to bring air transport fully into the regulatory
structure by which Community competition law, and the rules on freedom
to provide services, can be enforced, especially by the Commission. This
is, of course, in addition to the Commission's inherent enforcement powers under the Treaty, which it had already begun to deploy. 13 The principal
statute in the package is Regulation 3975/87 on the Application of the
Rules of Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 14 which
entered into force on January 1, 1988. This resembles Regulations
1017/68 (on road, rail, and inland waterway transport)' 5 and 4056/86 (on
maritime transport) 16 in the similarity of its basic enforcement provisions
to those in the original Regulation 17/62 (on general enforcement powers), 17 that is, especially with reference to the Commission's powers to
investigate, issue cease and desist orders, and impose fines and penalties
for violations. Like Regulation 5056/86, and unlike Regulation 1017/68, it
fortunately does not contain its own definitions of prohibited activities,
relying instead simply on the prohibitions of articles 85-86, EEC. Unlike
Regulation 4056/86, its own list of special exemptions from those prohibitions is limited to those for certain agreements designed to achieve
purely technical improvements or cooperation (article 2). The brief Annex
provides a nonexhaustive list of such types of agreement.
The separate Regulation 3976/8718 (another part of the package) empowers the Commission to enact "block exemption" regulations giving
effect to article 85(3), EEC (such regulations to remain effective until
January 31, 1991-article 3) and lists nonexhaustively many matters that
the Council considers the Commission "may" exempt under Article 85(3).
The Commission has announced' 9 that it has drafted three regulations to
12. See previous discussions of this topic in Regional Developments: European Coininunities, 21 INT'L LAW. 571, 577; 21 INT'L LAW. 1205 (1987); 22 INT'L LAW. 570-71 (1988).
13. See sources cited supra note 12.
14. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 374) 1 (1987).
15. II O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 175) 1 (1968), 11 J.0. COMM. EUR. 302 (1968).
16. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 4 (1986).
17. 5 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 204 (1962), 2-5 J.0. COMM. EUR. 87 (1959-62).
18. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (1987).

19. Press Release IP(88)234.
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be made under this power. These will cover agreements between air transport undertakings concerning: 1. joint planning and coordination of capacity, revenue sharing, tariff consultation, and slot allocation at airports;
2. provision of ground handling services; and 3. (computerized) timetabling and ticket-reservation systems.
The Council's legislative package is completed by Directive 87/601/EEC
on Fares for Scheduled Air Services between Member States 20 and Decision 87/602/EEC on Sharing Capacity and Access to Routes in Scheduled
Air Services between Member States. 2 1 These are addressed to Member
State Governments, rather than air transport undertakings, and are designed to force governmental regulatory practices into conformity with
the new competitive mode. The Federal Republic of Germany has declared, for the removal of doubt, that this whole package does not apply
22
to Land Berlin.
A distinctive feature of this legislative package is that all these provisions only apply to "international air transport between Community airports." 23 Excluded therefore are: 1.transport between airports in the
same Member State; and 2. transport between Member State and nonMember State airports. Since restrictions or abuses affecting both these
types of transport may, in certain circumstances, be capable of affecting
trade between Member States, and hence be prohibited by articles
85-86, EEC, the Commission would have to proceed against such viola24
tions by using its inherent enforcement powers under article 89, EEC.
Meanwhile the Commission has continued its proceedings against thirteen Community airlines, which it began in 1986 under its inherent article
89, EEC powers, but has informed the airlines that as of January 1, 1988,
it will use its new Regulation 3975/87 powers, as regards violative agree25
ments and practices formally continuing to exist after that date.
B.

MARITIME AND INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORT

In Re Maritime Transport between Italy and Algeria26 Italy has been
authorized by the Commission to ratify its Maritime Transport Treaty

20. 30 O.J. EOR. COMM. (No. L 374) 12 (1987).
21. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 19 (1987).
22. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 26 (1987).
23. Reg. 3975/87, art. 1, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) I (1987); 3976/87, art. 1, 30
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (1987); see also Dir. 87/601, art. 1, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 374) 12 (1987); Dec. 87/602, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 19 (1987).
24. EEC Treaty, supra note I. See also sources, supra note 12.
25. Press Releases IP(87)343, IP(87)614.
26. Dir. 87/475/EEC, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 272) 37 (1987), 51 Common Mkt. L.R.
603 (1988).
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with Algeria as complying with both the Community's ratification of the
UN Convention on Liner Conferences 27 and with (Community) Regulation 4055/86 on Freedom to Provide Services in Maritime Transport. 28 In
Re Hyundai Merchant Marine29 the Commission has opened proceedings
in relation to alleged illicit subsidies from the Korean Government constituting unfair pricing practices affecting the EEC-Australia liner trade,
in what appears to be the first proceedings taken under Regulation
30
4057/86 on Unfair Pricing Practices.
Supplementing Regulation 1017/68 on Competition in Road, Rail and
Inland Waterway Transport, 3 1 the Council has enacted Directive
87/540/EEC on Access to the Occupation of Carrier of Goods by Waterway
in National and International Transport and on the Mutual Recognition
of Diplomas, Certificates and Other Evidence of Formal Qualifications
for this Occupation. 32 Thus, freedom to provide competitive services in
this sector is enhanced.
C.

CONCENTRATIONS (MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS)

In its historic judgment in the Continental Can case 33 in 1973, the ECJ
held that article 86, EEC (prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position)
could be used by the Commission as the basis for intervention, under its
Regulation 17/6234 enforcement powers, to prevent a takeover bid or
merger where one party thereto already enjoyed dominance in the relevant
market and the resulting concentration would (deliberately?) remove a
competitor of that party from the market. (On the facts, the ECJ found,
however, that the Commission had failed to establish by the evidence the
existence of a dominant position. Nevertheless, the judgment was sufficient to cause Continental Can to abandon the bid, and to agree, in effect,
to a divestiture order with the Commission). That ruling was somewhat
unexpected in some quarters, since the wording of article 86, EEC, gives
no hint (unlike the correlative article 66, ECSC) that it is concerned with
concentrations. It also created a certain procedural difficulty for both the
Commission and undertakings party to an impending concentration, in
that article 86, unlike article 85, EEC, contains no power whereby the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Mkt.
34.

Reg. 954/79, 22 O.J. EUR.
29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
Supra note 15.
30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
Europemballage Corp. v.
L.R. 199 (1973).
Supra note 17.

COMM. (No. L 121) 1 (1979), 13 I.L.M. 910 (1974).
L 378) 1 (1986).
L 308) 3 (1987), 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 389 (1988).
L 378) 14 (1986).

L 322) 20 (1987).
E.C. Comm'n, 1973 Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common
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Commission can exempt from its provisions concentrations that might fall
within the ECJ's interpretation of article 86, but which might be considered highly desirable, from the public interest or market integration point
of view, on other grounds.
In what may also come to be regarded as a landmark decision, the ECJ
has not held, in British-American Tobacco v. E.C. Commission (also known

as the Philip Morris case), 35 that article 85 may also be relied on by the
Commission in certain circumstances as the basis for intervening in a
potential concentration, for example, (in casu) where one undertaking
acquired or increased an equity holding (of shares) in a competitor, even
where no party had a dominant position in the relevant market (so that
article 86 would be unavailable), and the resulting holding was not such
as to give the holder a controlling interest in the competitor.
In this case, initially Rembrandt (R) wholly owned Rothmans Tobacco
(Holdings) (RTH), which itself had a controlling interest in Rothmans
International (RI). In 1981 R sold 50 percent of its holding in RTH to
Philip Morris (PM) by an agreement the terms of which gave each party
first refusal on any disposal of RTH shares by the other party and the
right to appoint half the RTH board, but which excluded PM from any
information concerning RI's competitive position in markets where RI
and PM were competitors. Nevertheless the applicants, and others, who
were also competitors of RI and PM complained to the Commission, which
36
took the view that the agreement violated both articles 85 and 86, EEC.
After negotiations with the commission, R and PM made a new agreement
under which PM abandoned its RTH holding in exchange for a direct (but
noncontrolling) holding in RI, rights of first refusal, but no board seats.
The Commission approved the new agreement, but the applicants still
objected to it; and when the Commission rejected their objections as
unfounded, they sued for judicial review of that decision before the ECJ
in the present action. The Court accepted the applicants' contentions that
any acquisition by one party of shares in a competitor might, on the facts,
amount to an agreement prohibited by article 85, EEC, even if it were
not an abuse of dominance prohibited by article 86, EEC. This would be
particularly likely where the acquisition gave the first party legal or de
facto control of the second, but it could also occur on the acquisition of
a mere minority holding as here (less than 25 percent), where the acquisition had the object for the future, or actual present effect (or the risk
of such an effect), of producing some coordination between the two parties
35. British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 178) 3 (1984);
R.J. Reynolds Indus. v. E.C. Comm'n, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 195) 4 (1984) (supported

by Philip Morris and Rembrandt Group intervening), 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 24 (1988).
36. Press Release IP(84)120, 40 Common Mkt. L.R. 40 (1984).
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restrictive of competition between them. Each case had to be considered
on its own facts, in the light of the surrounding economic context and the
structure of the market. While the Commission had to be especially vigilant in such cases, nevertheless there was sufficient evidence in this case
on which the Commission could properly find, as it had done, that there
was no restrictive intent or (significant) effect. Moreover, in the absence
of such object or effect, and with no competitor actually removed from
the market, there could be no abuse of any dominance, and so no need
for the Commission to enquire whether any party was dominant, for article
86 purposes. The Court would not therefore interfere with the Commission's decision.
Thus, although the Commission won on the facts, the significance of
the judgment lies in that henceforward all acquisitions of shares (or other
interests) in a competitor, however minor, are suspect from the article
85, EEC point of view. Legal security would dictate, therefore, that they
should all be notified to the Commission, and a negative clearance or an
article 85(3) exemption sought. Lack of a dominant position will not be
an adequate defense in such a case. It is true that British-American Tobacco involved elaborate overall corporate structure agreements between
two main participants, but there is nothing in the judgment to suggest
that piecemeal acquisitions of shares from various transferors in ordinary
stock exchange dealing could not also fall into the doctrine, since each
transfer involves an agreement, and each agreement might be made with
a restrictive object on the part of one of the parties (does article 85, EEC
require the "object" of an agreement to be shared by all the parties to
it?), or might have a restrictive effect when taken together with other
similar agreements all having one party in common.
An interesting immediate application of the British-American Tobacco
doctrine involved some of the participants in the original Continental
Can37 case, namely Carnaud and Schmalbach-Lubeca. 38 Here Carnaud
(C), a French manufacturer of, inter alia, metallic beverage cans, sought
to acquire 66.6 percent of the shares in Sofreb (SO), another French
manufacturer of such cans, from Sacilor (SA). The remaining 33.4 percent
of SO shares were held by Schmalbach Lubeca (SL), a German subsidiary
of Continental Can (CC), acquired in the 1972 maneuvering. SL complained to the Commission, and also obtained an interim injunction from
the French national court preventing further dealing in SO shares pending
the Commission's finding. SL's ground of complaint was that C's acquisition of the controlling interest in SO shares would be likely to lead,

37. Supra note 33.

38. Press Release IP(88)14, 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 262 (1988).
WINTER 1988
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through CC's control of SL (the minority shareholder) to coordination
restrictive of competition between C and CC in the relevant market where
C was substantial and CC possibly dominant (exactly the sort of situation
the Commission had intervened in with the same parties back in 1972);
therefore the C-SA deal was prohibited by article 85, if not article 86,
EEC. The Commission substantially accepted this argument. At this point
C offered to buy SL's minority holding in SO as well, if the Commission
would approve. The Commission did approve, on the basis that C, by
acquiring the whole of SO, did not significantly increase its market share
even though it deliberately eliminated a competitor, where as it did remove
the danger of C-CC collusion, and made C, on balance, better able to
compete with CC, the market leader, than either C or SO had been
previously.
The case is instructive in a number of ways. First, SL was legally able
to rely on its own (i.e., its parent's) market strength to block an acquisition
by a competitor. Second, SL, as minority shareholder, was thereby able
to force the would-be majority shareholder, C, to buy out the whole
minority interest as the price of acquiescence in the majority acquisition.
Third, SL was able to do this by relying on the threat of its own (in effect)
collusion with its competitor, C, if its minority interest was bought by C.
SL appears therefore to have achieved its goals by considerable finesse.
From the point of view of the public interest in concentrations, the outcome is probably the desirable one, and the Commission's approach is
therefore to be welcomed. The case shows that the British-American
Tobacco doctrine gives the Commission a subtle and flexible tool for
intervention in concentrations, with power to approve or disapprove according to nice appreciations of market realities; a useful alternative to
the difficult search for dominance and abuse entailed in the use of article
86, EEC, in this context.
Another important recent case on concentration is Re British Airways
and British Caledonian'sMerger.39 Since this involves the merger of two

competing airlines, it is the first concentration case in which the Commission could use its power under Regulation 3975/87.40 As the price of
approving the merger from the point of view of articles 85 and 86, EEC,
the Commission was able to extract significant undertakings binding upon
the merged entity, additional to those given to the U.K. Monopolies and
Mergers Commission, designed to produce a compensating increase in
competition between the new airline and its other competitors, actual and
potential.

39. Press Release IP(88)131; 51 Common Mkt. L.R. 258 (1988).
40. Supra note 14.
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